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Abstract: More aggressive acquiring firms paid higher executive 
compensation than non or less aggressive acquiring firms. This paper applies 
the generalized propensity score (GPS) methodology to estimate the 
relationship between a firm’s acquisition and its executive compensation. 
Allowing for continuous treatment, that is, different levels of the firms’ 
acquisition activities, we apply the GPS method on a panel data set of 
Chinese Public Listed Companies (PLCs) and find that there is a causal effect 
of firms’ acquisition activities on executive compensation. However, there is 
a divergent interests between the board directors and executive managers 
which may bring serious agency problem in the acquisition decision. The 
self-selection effect plays a dominant role in the acquisition premiums of top 
3 board directors, while the learning-by-acquiring effect on compensation is 
more prominent for executive managers than board directors. As the 
executive managers as a whole, can benefit more executive management 
positions as well as higher growth of executive compensation from 
aggressive acquisition than board directors and top 3 executive managers.  
Keywords: Acquisition Decision; Executive Compensation; Generalized Propensity 
Score; Agency problem 
JEL Classification: C14, G34, J33, M12 
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1. Introduction 
This paper investigates the effect of corporate acquisitions on executive compensation 
in China. Prior to the start of reforms in 1978, all ranks of members of Chinese 
society were employed by government and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as their 
wages were centrally determined by the Bureau of Labor and Personnel through a 
national wage grid system (Meng, Shen, & Xue, 2013). High-ranking officials and 
powerful elites, however benefited from preferential treatment and sundry perquisites 
(Adithipyangkul, Alon, & Zhang, 2011). One of the key elements of economic 
liberalization has been the privatization and capitalization of SOEs based on market 
rules. A well-functioning market in corporate executives first emerged in China in the 
1980s, prompted by state experimentation with an array of managerial incentives to 
accompany the gradual withdrawal of the state from its ownership of corporate 
enterprises (Xu, 2011). Since the early 1990s, there has been a miraculous 
development of capital market
1
, which has immediately become the engine of China's 
growth in the first decade of the 2000s. The Chinese Public Listed Companies (PLCs) 
had accounted for 43 per cent of China’s GDP in 2010, which was only 14 per cent 
ten years ago (Bryson et al., 2012b).  
During the modernization of economic system, corporate acquisition has become 
an important phenomenon in the Chinese stock market (Peng, Kang, & Jiang, 2013). 
Table 1 shows that annual completed deals of Chinese PLCs have increased from 51 
                                                             
1
 There is a dramatic development of the publicly listed sector of companies in China since the 
early 1990s. In 1992, only 53 companies were publicly listed in the Chinese capital market which 
had subsequently grown to 1163 in 2001 and 2126 in 2010 (Bryson, Forth, & Zhou, 2012b).   
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billion RMB Yuan in 2003 to 276 billion RMB Yuan in 2008. In 2003, about 24% 
Chinese PLCs acquired stocks or assets, as the acquisition intensity (denoted as the 
acquisition-asset ratio) was about 7% for all acquiring PLCs. Five years later, the 
proportion of acquiring PLCs increased to 33%, as the acquisition intensity also 
increased to more than 12% for all acquiring PLCs in 2008. Among the most 
important and high profile corporate investments, corporate acquisitions are different 
from internal research and development (R&D) or capital expenditures and create 
large value impacts easily observable to outsiders (Zhao, 2013).  
INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) put forward the agency problem between board 
directors and executive managers, arguing that the separation of ownership and 
control in modern corporations demands close monitoring of managers’ behavior by 
principals to protect shareholders’ benefits. Managers have the opportunity and 
incentives to act in their own interests at the expense of shareholders. In order to 
reduce shareholders’ monitoring cost on executive management, especially on the 
more complicated acquisition management with high uncertainty, higher 
compensation for executive management in acquiring PLCs, i.e. acquisition premiums 
may be incentive for the risky acquisition. As Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest, 
“the future expenditures are likely to involve uncertainty (i.e., they are subject to 
probability distributions) and therefore some allowance must be made for their risk.” 
Hence, as the privatization of Chinese SOEs, the growing uncertainty and risk of 
executive management should be compensated by higher payment, which would be 
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more prominent for executive management handling more complicated acquisition 
decisions. Moreover, managerial power and social network theories posit that 
powerful executives with higher social capital can influence the compensation 
decisions made by the board of directors or the compensation committee (Belliveau, 
O'Reilly, & Wade, 1996; Finkelstein, & Hambrick, 1989). When the executive 
management is dealing with acquisition decision, the executive power and social 
capital may decrease the uncertainty and increase the success odds. Hence, acquisition 
premiums of executive compensation could be rewards for being trust, powerful and 
more external network and elite institutional ties which reflects executive higher 
ability to search and match acquisition offers in the market, rather than incentives to 
reduce their opportunism (Peng et al., 2013; Sun et al., 2010). Therefore, associated 
with greater uncertainty and agency problems, corporate acquisitions offer an ideal 
setting to examine the efficacy of executive compensation in managerial incentive 
alignment in China.  
As to why acquiring firms can pay more to executive managers than 
non-acquiring firms, i.e. acquisition premiums, there are two alternative but not 
mutually exclusive strands of literatures. The first strand points to the cause-effect 
relation between acquisition and executive compensation. So the 
compensation-increasing effect of acquisition results from the higher incentive for 
more serious agency problem in the acquiring firms and the higher demands for risk 
taking, trust power and external network for executive management in acquisition 
(Sun, Zhao, & Yang, 2010). Moreover, the acquisition premiums are rewards for 
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executive management’s specific knowledge and expertise of new market through 
learning-by-acquiring that non-acquiring firms do not have.  
Based on this, we build up our hypotheses 1 &2 by assuming that the monitoring 
cost and risk are increasing with the acquisition scale. The larger is acquisition, the 
more demand for executive management’s incentive to take risk, trust, power and 
social capital. The big acquisition also provides better chances to jump a better 
strategic status in the coordination and centralization institutions. The 
compensation-increasing effect of acquisition results from knowledge and expertise of 
new market that non-acquiring firms do not have. Following the law of declining 
marginal productivity, the effect of learning-by-acquiring would increase fast at the 
stage of small acquisition intensity but slow down later as the acquisition intensity 
exceed the adaptation ability. Whether or not acquiring has a positive effect on 
executive compensation might, however, not simply depend on a firm’s acquisition 
status, but might be a function of the extent of the firm’s acquisition activities. In this 
paper, we will work on the basis of the latter argument and analyze the effect of 
acquisition on firms’ executive compensation growth at each acquisition-asset ratio in 
the interval from zero to one or the maximum level. If we can show that acquisition 
improves executive compensation only within a sub-interval of the range of firms’ 
acquisition-asset ratio whereas it has no or even a negative effect within another 
sub-interval due to high risk, this can at least partly explain why those studies that 
confine themselves to firms’ acquisition status do not find any impact of firms’ 
acquisition activities on executive compensation growth. Hence, we have hypothesis 
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of acquisition premiums as: 
 
Hypothesis 1: With the moderation of capital market, the executive compensation of 
Chinese PLCs could increase very fast to reflect more risk taking of the executive 
management and more incentive in agency problem.  
  
Hypothesis 2: Acquiring firms pay more to executive managers than non-acquiring 
firms for executives’ special knowledge and expertise, so there are positive 
acquisition premiums. 
 
The second strand points to self-selection of the firms with more resources into 
acquisition markets. The reason for this is that acquisition need more resources than 
less successful firms can bear. A recent survey of micro-econometric studies confirms 
that the more productive firms self-select into acquisition markets (Zhao, 2013). The 
compensation-increasing effect of acquisition may only reflect the better financial 
resources and even better corporate governance of acquiring firms, rather than a 
spurious cause-effect relation between acquisition and executive compensation.  
Based on this, we draw up the hypotheses 3&4. We need use matching method to 
compare executive compensation of matched PLCs with different acquisition. 
Matched PLCs have very similar characteristics of financial resources and governance. 
Hence, the different acquisition premiums of matched firms can reflect the 
compensation-increasing effect disentangled the self-selection problem. We have 
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hypotheses as follow:   
 
Hypothesis 3: If acquisition decision is only self-selection, i.e. without the effect of the 
hypothesis 1 or 2, when we compare executive compensation of matched PLCs with 
different treatment levels of acquisition intensity, we could find no difference in 
growth rates of executive compensations over the interval of acquisition intensity.   
 
Hypothesis 4: If acquisition is not only self-selection, when we compare executive 
compensation of matched PLCs with different acquisition, the 
compensation-increasing effect may decline after arriving a maximum point and show 
a non-linear pattern of learning-by-acquiring curve between acquisition premiums 
and acquisition intensity. 
 
In Chinese transition process, the market-based compensation is still a relatively 
new subject of inquiry so that there are few studies of executive compensation 
(Adithipyangkul et al., 2011; Sun et al., 2010). In this paper, we regard the dramatic 
capitalization process as a natural social experiment to investigate the executive 
compensation in this largest transition economy. Our contribution to literature is to 
disentangle the effects of acquisition on executive compensation from the 
self-selection problem by comparing similar PLCs with different acquisition, i.e. 
matching method. Matching can avoid the self-selection problem to get the treatment 
effects of acquisition on executive compensation as in a designed experiment, even 
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though our data are non-experimental. In this paper, we analyze the causal 
relationship between firms’ executive compensation growth rates and their 
acquisition-asset ratios, using a large data set for Chinese Public Listed Companies 
(PLCs) and applying the newly developed continuous treatment methodology. We 
show that there is a causal effect of firms’ acquisition activities on executive 
compensation. However, too aggressive acquisition which exceeds their 
learning-by-acquiring range cannot improve executive compensation. The 
self-selection effect really exists but not the main force behind the increasing 
acquisition premiums. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the second 
sector introduces the empirical model; the third section presents the data and some 
descriptive statistics, while the empirical results are discussed in the fourth section. 
Some concluding remarks are provided in the fifth section.  
 
2. Empirical methodology 
Following Hirano and Imbens (2004) and Bia and Mattei (2008), we apply a 
three-stage approach to implement the generalized propensity score (GPS) method. 
The GPS method allows for continuous treatment, that is, in our case, different levels 
of firms’ acquisition intensity. We estimate the average potential growth of executive 
compensation for each level of the firms’ acquisition intensity (the dose–response 
function). Although the assignment of the acquisition offers may be random in the 
capital market (Peng et al., 2013), substantial factors would change the exogeneity of 
acquisition intensity in the executive compensation decision system and make the 
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acquiring PLCs a self-selected sample where the firms’ acquisition intensity is no 
longer independent of corporate finance and governance. In using the GPS matching 
programs, we can effective reduce, if not to eliminate, the bias generated by 
unobservable confounding factors (Bia, & Mattei, 2008).  
For each PLC i in the acquiring sample, we observe a p × 1 vector of 
pretreatment covariates in year t, Xit, including variables of characteristics of 
corporate finance (Finit) and governance (Goverit); the treatment received, Ait is the 
acquisition intensity; and the value of the outcome variable associated with this 
treatment, Wit is the annul executive compensation of the PLCit. The first step is to 
estimate the conditional distribution of the treatment given the covariates. We assume 
that the treatment (or its transformation) has a normal distribution conditional on the 
covariates. The generalized propensity score r(a, x) is estimated by using regression 
as follows:  
    
(1)        Ait =β0+β1Finit+β2Goverit+β3Yeart+β4Indj+εit   
= Xitβ+εit,  εit～(0,σ
2
I)                                 
 
where Ait is the acquisition intensity of PLC i in year t; characteristics of corporate 
finance (Finit) and governance (Goverit) factors; year (Yeart) and industry dummies 
(Indj) to capture time dynamics and industry fixed effects; and the random residual 
error εit . To simplify the notation, we will drop the subscript of i and t in the sequel. 
β1 is the vector of coefficients of corporate financial variables (Finit) including: 
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lnCashit (log form annual cash holding, including cash and tradable financial assets); 
lnIntastit (log form intangible asset); Leverageit (book value of total debt deflated by 
the book value of total asset); lnCapexpit (the log capital expenditure);Qit (Tobins’ Q 
ratio, market value of total assets deflated by book value of total assets). β2 is the 
vector of coefficients of corporate governance variables (Goverit) including: 
BoardSizeit (the number of directors of a company); Meetingtimesit (board meeting 
times per annum); Inddpropit (portion of number of independent directors among 
board directors); Magtholdingit (the shares percentage holding by senior management); 
Dualityit (CEO duality, 0=CEO holds the Chair of the board of directors, 1= splitting 
two positions between two different individuals). We present descriptive statistics of 
the above variables in both acquiring sample and full sample in Appendix. 
As in Hirano and Imbens (2004), the propensity function is defined as the 
conditional density of the acquisition intensity a, given the observed covariates, x: r( a, 
x)= fA∣X ( a∣x). Then the generalized propensity score is defined as R = r(A, X). The 
GPS has a balancing property that within strata with the same value of r(a, x), the 
probability that A = a does not depend on the value of X: X⊥I(A = a) | r(a, x), where 
I(·) is the indicator function
2
. It suggests that within the matched cases of acquisition 
intensity, the acquisition intensity is independent from the corporate finance and 
                                                             
2
 Hence, the key assumption of the GPS method is a generalisation of the strong 
unconfoundedness assumption made by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) for binary treatments 
(Imbens, 2000). Hirano and Imbens (2004) show that, in combination with a suitable 
unconfoundedness assumption, this balancing property implies that assignment to acquisition 
intensity is unconfounded, given the GPS. Assuming that the assignment to the treatment is 
weakly unconfounded, Hirano and Imbens (2004) prove that adjusting for the GPS eliminates any 
biases associated with differences in the pretreatment variables. 
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governance. Let the acquisition intensity A take on values in the interval A= [a0, a1]. 
The acquisition intensity is assumed to be conditionally independent with the 
executive compensation, measured at an arbitrarily chosen level a of the acquisition 
intensity. Based on the GPS method, it is possible to estimate a dose-response 
function that depicts the average potential executive compensation E[W(a)] evaluated 
at any level or dose of the continuous acquisition intensity.  
In the second stage, we estimate the conditional expectation of the executive 
compensation as a function of two scalar variables, the treatment level A and the GPS 
R: β(a, r) = E (W | A = a, R = r). We model the conditional expectation of the 
outcome, Wi, given Ai and Ri, as a flexible function of its two arguments. We use 
polynomial approximations of order two model:  
 
(2)     ϕ {E (Wi | Ai, Ri)} = ψ(Ai, Ri ; α)= α0 + α1Ai + α2Ai
2
+α3Ri+α4Ri
2
+α5Ai*Ri 
 
where ϕ(·) is a link function that relates the predictor, ψ(Ai, Ri; α), to the conditional 
expectation, E (Wi | Ai, Ri). As Hirano and Imbens (2004) emphasize, there is no direct 
meaning to the estimated coefficients in the selected model, except that testing 
whether all coefficients involving the GPS are equal to zero can be interpreted as a 
test of whether the covariates introduce any bias. 
In the third stage, we estimate the dose–response function by averaging the 
estimated conditional expectation over the GPS at each level of the acquisition 
intensity we are interested in. The last step consists of averaging the estimated 
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regression function over the score function evaluated at the desired level of the 
acquisition intensity. Specifically, in order to obtain an estimate of the entire dose–
response function, we estimate the average potential executive compensation for each 
level of the treatment from tenth percentile to the maximum as:  
 
(3)             ( ) ̂  
 
 
∑  ̂    ̂(    ) 
 
    
 
 
∑      ̂    ̂(    )   ̂ 
 
    
where  ̂ is the vector of the estimated parameters in the second stage; β(a, r) = E 
{W(a) | r(a, X) = r} = E (W | A = a, R = r) as in the second stage. Hirano and Imbens 
(2004) state that asymptotic standard errors of the estimated dose–response function 
could be calculated by using expansions based on the estimating equations; these 
should take into account the estimation of the GPS as well as the α parameters. For 
practical reasons, this paper uses bootstrap methods (100 observations each time) to 
obtain standard errors and confidence intervals of the dose–response function that 
take into account estimation of the GPS and the α parameters. 
 
3. Data description 
The empirical tests employ the CCER (China Center for Economic Research) PLC 
database of financial statement and corporate governance. This dataset includes all 
PLCs in the Chinese stock market during the fiscal years 2003-2008. We exclude 
PLCs subject to special treatment (ST, that is, firms reporting two consecutive annual 
losses) and financial institutions (Global Industry Standard Classification between 
401010 and 403030) because investing and financing activities are ambiguous for 
14 
 
these firms.  
We have three measures of executive compensation: total annual compensation of 
top three board directors (compen1); total annual compensation of top three executive 
directors (compen2); and total annual compensation of all executive mangers 
(compen3). The main concern on the acquisition premiums of executive compensation 
is their form and components. First of all, with more equity-based payment, firms get 
more benefit from acquisition, and competitors help to improve the performance of 
acquiring firms in stock market (Datta, Iskandar‐Datta, & Raman, 2001). CEO 
compensation in the United States is dominated by stock options. In Europe, a 
substantial proportion of total compensation is based on Long-term Incentive Plans 
(LTIPs), although share options have become increasingly important there too 
(Conyon, Fernandes, Ferreira, Pedro, & Murphy, 2012).  
However, the incentive options available to firms in China in the early 2000s 
differ somewhat from those used in the United States and Europe. In China, firms 
were unable to offer stock options until 2006 and the trading of managerial stock 
holdings was tightly restricted until the early 2000s. Hence, Chinese PLCs has seldom 
used stock option as incentive for CEOs, which can provide a comparatively simple 
experimental environment for this research. Equity incentives are rare in China so we 
rely solely on cash compensation. Another concern is whether there is a performance 
bonds in the incentive package of CEO. Bryson, Forth, and Zhou (2012a) find that 
only one-tenth of corporations deploy performance bonds, the mean (median) value of 
which is about 14(6) percent of the cash compensation received by the CEO of a 
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listed corporation in 2003. Thus, cash compensation and bonuses constitute a greater 
proportion of total compensation in China than they do in the USA and Europe 
(Bryson et al., 2012a). We focus on CEOs’ annual cash compensation and bonuses as 
the proxy of executive compensation in Chinese PLCs in this paper.  
Table 2 shows that executive compensation in China has increased very fast. For 
example, the top 3 board directors of Chinese PLCs, typically comprising the 
Chairman, the Executive Vice-Chairman and the Chief Board Officer, earned average 
0.43 million RMB in 2003 which had increased to average 1.02 million in 2008 with 
annual growth rate of 17.2%. The acquiring PLCs paid almost the same to the top 3 
board directors in 2003 (0.47 million RMB), while those in the acquiring PLCs had 
about 16% higher earnings (1.18 million) in 2008 than the average of all, and faster 
annual growth rate (18.49%) over the entire period. Using different measures of 
executive compensations such as top 3managers, typically comprising the CEO, the 
Executive Vice-President and the Chief Finance Officer
3
, and all executive directors 
would get similar conclusion. It is consistent with Hypothesis 1 that the executive 
compensation could increase very fast to reflect more risk taking and incentive over 
the capitalization process. This movement of executive compensation in tandem with 
acquisition naturally arise an interesting question whether the acquisition of Chinese 
PLCs increase their executive compensation and what is the mechanism within this 
relation.  
INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
                                                             
3
 The top 3 executive managers here are not in the board.  
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In table 3, we categorize the treatment of acquisition intensity into 5 levels: 0%, 
0-1%, 1-3%, 3-8% and above 8%. Allowing for zero values of the treatment implies 
that untreated sample might be included in the study. Because the GPS methods are 
designed for analyzing the effect of treatment intensity, they specifically refer to the 
subpopulation of treated units. This implies that including untreated units might lead 
to misleading results. Hence, we follow Bia and Martti (2008), and only apply the 
GPS on the treated group and leave the untreated group as a baseline to compare.  
For the next 4 groups, we categorize the treatment interval according to the 
quartiles of the distribution of the acquisition intensity. Only about one quarter 
acquiring PLCs have acquisition intensity more than 8%. Table 3 associates the three 
measures of executive compensation in PLCs with their acquisition intensity. In 2003, 
acquiring PLCs paid more executive compensation than non-acquiring PLCs except 
the top quartile group (above 8%). The highest executive compensation is found in the 
0-1% interval of acquisition intensity (for example, 0.55 million for the top 3 board 
directors), while the lowest executive compensation are in the untreated group (0.42 
million) and the top quartile group (0.40 million). The 1-3% and 3%-8% intervals of 
acquisition intensity also have higher executive compensation than in the untreated 
group. Hence, our findings basically support Hypothesis 2 on positive 
compensation-increasing effects of acquisition intensity. The non-linear association 
between executive compensation level and acquisition intensity, however casts doubts 
on the self-selection Hypothesis 3, because the most aggressive acquiring PLCs do 
not pay the highest executive compensation. 
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Except the 0-1% interval, the higher acquisition intensity has higher annual 
growth of executive compensation after 2003. For the top 3 border directors, the 
annual growth rates of executive compensation over the period 2003-2008 was only 
15.14%, compared with 16.09% in the untreated sample. For the higher acquisition 
intervals more than 1%, the annual growth of executive compensation is much higher 
than the untreated and the 0-1% interval group. Similar situations are found for top 3 
managers and all executive managers. Hence, as the acquisition-asset ratios increase 
beyond 1%, the executive compensation grows faster than non-acquiring PLCs. The 
growth rates become higher as the acquisition intensity increases which is consistent 
with our Hypothesis on learning-by-acquiring. The more risk taking in the larger 
acquisition intensity is appreciated by paying the higher executive compensation. This 
complicated pattern of levels and growth of executive compensation associated with 
the acquisition intensity recall more advanced techniques to identify.    
INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE 
 
4. Empirical Results 
We present results of the first stage regression in Table 4. First of all, we have 1% 
extreme cases which have the acquisition intensity more than 100%, indicating the 
annual acquisition scale is more than the PLC’s total asset. We can simply exclude 
acquisition intensity more than 100% and focus on the truncated/restricted sample 
with 1978 firm-year observations. Alternatively, we regard the full acquiring sample 
as the unrestricted treatment with 1998 firm-year observations. Because we used 
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Box-Cox transformation on the acquisition intensity, the 20 extremely large 
acquisition intensity cases would not violate our normality assumption. Thus, we can 
compare the unrestricted and restricted samples using the GPS method to test the 
sensitivity to the extremely large cases of acquisition.   
Second, it is not a surprise to see the negative association between the asset 
variables (cash/intangible asset/leverage) and the acquisition intensity, because 
acquisition intensity is defined as a ratio of annual acquisition to total asset. The 
higher market value of the PLC increases the acquisition intensity. More board 
meeting time may be a proxy of better corporate governance and can afford higher 
acquisition intensity. More management holding share and the separation of CEO and 
board chairman can make the acquisition intensity more cautious. 
Last but not least, the Box–Cox transformation finds the maximum likelihood 
estimates of the parameters regress the treatment variable A (acquisition intensity) on 
the control variables. The set of the potential treatment values is divided into 4 
intervals as described in Table 3. The values of the evaluated at the representative 
point of each treatment interval are divided into 5 intervals to do the balancing 
property t to test that the conditional mean of the pre-treatment variables given the 
generalized propensity score is not different between units who belong to a particular 
treatment interval and units who belong to all other treatment intervals. Both 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov normality test and balancing property t test are significant at 
least at 5% level.    
INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE 
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The resulting dose-response function of stage 2 and 3 is depicted in Figure 1-3. 
The horizontal axis is the normalized 100 percentiles of the acquisition intensity 
interval (1-1858.69% for the unrestricted sample; 1-100% for the restricted sample). 
The vertical axis is the estimated annual growth rate of executive compensation (%). 
the estimated dose-response function shows an increasing trend in the relationship 
between the acquisition intensity and the executive compensation growth rate for the 
top 3 board directors. The estimated annual growth rate of executive compensation 
amounts to about 25% at 10
th
 percentile of the unrestricted sample (Figure 1a) which 
exceeds the mean growth rate actually observed within the group of non-acquiring 
PLCs by 10 percentage points (see panel a of Table 3), Chinese PLCs that acquire a 
relatively small share of their total asset (acquisition intensity 0-1%, bottom quartile) 
exhibit a fast increase in their expected executive compensation growth rate. The 
slope of the dose-response function is relatively big within this interval of the 
acquisition intensity. The maximum value of the expected executive compensation 
growth rate reaches at the median of acquisition intensity (3%), where the expectation 
value of the annual growth rate amounts to 34%. Chinese PLCs of which the 
acquisition intensity exceeds this threshold value of acquisition intensity 3% exhibit a 
compensation growth rate that falls slightly below its maximum value, probably due 
to the high costs of monitoring and control they are faced with and which confine 
their compensation growth potential.    
For the restricted sample of top 3 board directors, there is a similar increasing 
trend from the 26% to 39%, also faster before the 25
th
 percentile acquisition intensity 
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(1%). However, the increasing trend of executive compensation is more prominent 
and uncertain in the restricted sample than in the unrestricted sample. Hence, the top 3 
board director sample is quite consistent with the self-selection Hypothesis 3, 
especially after the 25
th
 percentile point (1%), because the annual growth rate does not 
change much over the acquisition intensity interval. Additionally, the 20 extremely 
large acquisition intensities have significant effects on executive compensation which 
are more self-selected and more certain. 
In Figure 2a, the estimated dose-response function shows a similar increasing 
trend of the top 3 executive managers to that of top 3 board directors. The estimated 
annual growth rate increase from about 25% at 10
th
 percentile of the unrestricted 
sample to the maximum value of 37%, also with a faster increase during the 0-1% 
interval (bottom quartile). After then, the estimated growth rate is quite stable around 
36% over the rest of the interval. For the restricted sample (Figure 2b), with 
increasing uncertainty, the estimated growth rate sharply increase from 27% to 65%, 
and there is an acceleration of growth of executive compensation after the 75
th
 
percentile of acquisition intensity (>8%). Hence, after the 25
th
 percentile point (1%), 
the top 3 executive managers unrestricted sample is still consistent with the 
self-selection Hypothesis 3, while the restricted executive manger sample is more 
consistent with learning-by-acquiring Hypothesis 4 which shows a non-linear 
increasing relation between executive compensation and acquisition intensity. 
Generally speaking, Figure 3 (for all executive managers) is similar to the top3 
executive managers, but the increasing trend has become more prominent. In Figure 
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3a, the estimated annual growth rate increase from about 19% at 10
th
 percentile of the 
unrestricted sample to the maximum value of 36%, also with a faster increase during 
the 0-1% interval (bottom quartile). For the restricted sample (Figure 3b), the 
estimated growth rate rises from 21% to 95% with increasing uncertainty. The 
acceleration of growth of executive compensation happened earlier than the top 3 
executive manager after the median of acquisition intensity (>3%). Thus, both 
samples of all executive mangers show a learning-by-acquiring curve as in 
Hypothesis 4.  
The dose-response function displayed in Figure 1-3 suggests a rather 
deterministic relationship between Chinese PLC’s acquisition intensity and its 
executive compensation. Its functional form implies the interest divergence of board 
directors and executive management. Because the board directors are concerned with 
both capital value of the PLC and their individual compensation, they will be more 
cautious on acquisition decision than executive managers by recognizing some 
predetermined optimal acquisition intensity. However, from a managerial point of 
view, the more acquisition intensity may be means more incentive, power, external 
network, learning-by-acquiring, and then more cash compensation. Hence, the typical 
agency problem is that executive managers are less sensitive to the “excessive” 
acquisition than owners. And, it is doubtful that executive managers take more cost of 
search and match in the acquisition market to improve the post-acquisition 
performance and capital returns for owners. Thus, the process of organizational 
learning on how to deal with the challenges of a rising acquisition intensity has 
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probably not yet finished for Chinese PLCs.  
INSERT Figures 1-3 AROUND HERE 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper introduces the generalized propensity score (GPS) methodology developed 
by Imbens (2000) and Hirano and Imbens (2004) to the literature of firms’ acquisition 
behavior and executive compensation. A dose-response function of the GPS method is 
estimated to test the alternative but not mutually exclusive hypotheses as to whether 
more aggressive acquiring firms pay more to executive managers than non (less 
aggressive) acquiring firms, i.e. acquisition premiums.  
For top 3 board directors, the learning-by-acquiring effect on compensation is 
only found in the bottom quartile (0-1%) of the acquisition interval. As the Chinese 
PLCs exceeds this threshold value of acquisition intensity (1%), the growth rates of 
the top 3 border directors’ compensation slightly decrease or slowly increase with 
unaffordable risk for the two samples. It suggests that self-selection effect plays a 
dominant role in the acquisition premiums of top 3 board directors. Thus, board 
directors can learn from some controllable and low intensive acquisition and benefit 
from higher growth of compensation, while they need to concern too aggressive 
acquisition which may contain their compensation growth and bring too much 
uncertainty.  
We find different pattern of acquisition premiums in executive managers. The 
learning-by-acquiring effect on their compensation is more prominent for executive 
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managers, not only for top executive managers but also for all of them. The 
self-selection effect could only be found in those extremely relatively large 
acquisitions. It is consistent with the agency theory that management may have 
different interest from the owners. As the executive managers as a whole, can benefit 
even more executive management positions as well as higher growth of executive 
compensation from aggressive acquisition than board directors and top executive 
managers. It may be an incentive for the implicit collusion among executive managers 
and bring serious moral hazard problem in the acquisition decision process. 
Unfortunately, we have no detailed information for the number of all executive 
managers in this dataset and have to leave it for further research in the future. 
There are other some caveats to the empirical example presented in this paper, 
primarily related to data restrictions. Firstly, the number of observations in our data 
set may be the largest in relevant research but still relatively small. In particular, the 
number of Chinese PLCs of which the acquisition intensity exceeds 100% is very 
limited (20 cases, only 1% of the PLCs sampled), casting doubts on its so strong 
self-selection effect in our study and may bring biases from these extremely large 
cases. Secondly, as we control the heterogeneity of individual time-invariant fixed 
effect by using compensation growth, we actually drop the data of 2003. There are 
only about 400 observations each year which may be not for the same acquiring PLCs. 
Although the estimated dose-response function shows a plausible relationship 
between the PLC’s acquisition intensity and the executive compensation growth rate, 
the estimated confidence interval is relatively large at each point at which the 
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dose-response function was evaluated. Moreover, the confidence interval increases 
with the acquisition intensity and we apply 100 percentiles rather than real intensity. It 
is therefore questionable whether or not the expected compensation growth rate is 
significantly larger than the respective growth rate of more conservative PLCs, and 
whether executive managers also concern the higher risk of too aggressive acquisition. 
Tracking the firms over a longer time period and building up a balanced panel data set 
could be a way to get further insights into the acquisition and executive compensation 
relationship, in particular with respect to its temporal dimension (e.g., learning 
processes connected with acquisition activities). This analysis, however, is beyond the 
scope of this paper.  
In summary, the generalized propensity score method applied in this paper 
constitutes a new econometric technique that offers numerous opportunities for future 
research and promises to provide new insights into the acquisition-executive 
compensation relationship. 
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Figure 1. Estimated dose–response function, estimated derivative, and one 
standard deviation confidence bands 
 
Notes: 
Solid lines: estimated conditional expectation of logarithmic earnings of top 3 board directors growth 
rate (t – t-1) given the acquisition-asset ratio in t and the estimated generalized propensity score (GPS). 
Dotted lines: simulated one standard deviation, using the standard errors of the dose-response function 
estimated via bootstrapping (100 replications). 
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Figure 1a. Estimated dose–response function, top 3 
board directors, unrestricted full sample 
dose_response upper bound lower bound
0
20
40
60
80
0 20 40 60 80 100
gr
o
w
th
 r
at
e
 o
f 
e
xe
cu
ti
ve
 c
o
m
p
e
n
sa
ti
o
n
 (
%
) 
Acquisition intensity (interval 0-100%)  
Figure 1b. Estimated dose–response function, top 3 
board directors, restricted sample 
dose_response upper bound lower bound
28 
 
Figure 2. Estimated dose–response function, estimated derivative, and one 
standard deviation confidence bands 
 
Notes: 
Solid lines: estimated conditional expectation of logarithmic earnings of top 3 executive managers 
growth rate (t – t-1) given the acquisition-asset ratio in t and the estimated generalized propensity score 
(GPS). 
Dotted lines: simulated one standard deviation, using the standard errors of the dose-response function 
estimated via bootstrapping (100 replications). 
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Figure 2a. Estimated dose–response function, top 
3 executive managers, unrestricted full sample 
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Figure 3. Estimated dose–response function, estimated derivative, and one 
standard deviation confidence bands 
 
Notes: 
Solid lines: estimated conditional expectation of logarithmic earnings of all executive directors growth 
rate (t – t-1) given the acquisition-asset ratio in t and the estimated generalized propensity score (GPS). 
Dotted lines: simulated one standard deviation, using the standard errors of the dose-response function 
estimated via bootstrapping (100 replications). 
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Figure 3a. Estimated dose–response function, all  
executive directors, unrestricted full sample 
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Table 1. Corporate acquisition of Chinese PLCs, 2003-2008  
Year 
All 
PLCs 
Acquiring 
PLCs 
share 
Total 
acquisition 
volume, 
billion 
RMB 
Average 
acquisition 
volume, 
million 
RMB 
Acquisition intensity 
(%) 
All 
PLCs 
Acquiring 
PLCs 
2003 1,261 23.71 51 170 2.06 7.41 
2004 1,352 21.89 76 258 1.41 5.6 
2005 1,399 17.08 36 151 1.15 5.73 
2006 1,430 20.42 78 269 1.62 7.08 
2007 1,537 30.97 280 587 5.69 16.51 
2008 1,583 32.53 276 536 4.42 12.25 
2003-2008 8,562 24.73 798 377 2.85 10.13 
Data source: the China Center for Economic Research (CCER) PLC database 
2003-2008.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Executive Compensation of Chinese PLCs, 2003-2008 
Year 
Top 3 Board 
directors 
Top 3 Managers All executive directors 
All 
PLCs 
Acquirin
g PLCs  
All 
PLCs 
Acquiring 
PLCs  
All PLCs 
Acquiring 
PLCs  
2003 0.43 0.47 0.51 0.55 1.32 1.43 
2004 0.54 0.58 0.61 0.64 1.62 1.73 
2005 0.61 0.63 0.66 0.68 1.10 1.12 
2006 0.65 0.69 0.74 0.76 1.20 1.21 
2007 0.87 0.95 0.97 1.03 1.62 1.75 
2008 1.02 1.18 1.11 1.22 1.93 2.21 
Average 
annual 
growth rate 
(%) 
17.20 18.49 15.73 15.92 7.60 8.71 
Data source: the China Center for Economic Research (CCER) PLC database 
2003-2008.  
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Table 3. Acquisition intensity and annual growth rates of executive compensation 
in China, 2003-2008  
Acquisition 
intensity/  
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Annual 
growth 
rate (%) 
a. Acquisition intensity and the executive compensation of top 3 board directors 
0 0.42 0.52 0.60 0.64 0.83 0.93 16.09 
0-1% (25
th
 
percentile) 0.55 0.62 0.74 1.02 1.21 1.17 15.14 
1%-3% (50
th
 
percentile) 0.46 0.62 0.57 0.67 0.93 1.16 18.37 
3%-8% (75
th
 
percentile) 0.44 0.62 0.57 0.66 0.89 1.23 20.36 
8%+ 0.40 0.47 0.64 0.45 0.80 1.14 20.74 
b. Acquisition intensity and the executive compensation of top 3 managers 
0 0.49 0.60 0.66 0.74 0.94 1.05 15.29 
0-1% (25
th
 
percentile) 0.63 0.70 0.87 1.00 1.32 1.32 14.64 
1%-3% (50
th
 
percentile) 0.55 0.60 0.66 0.68 0.96 1.19 15.53 
3%-8% (75
th
 
percentile) 0.51 0.71 0.55 0.89 0.93 1.20 16.98 
8%+ 0.50 0.53 0.60 0.47 0.92 1.19 17.50 
c. Acquisition intensity and the executive compensation of all executive directors 
0 1.28 1.58 1.09 1.19 1.55 1.77 6.48 
0-1% (25
th
 
percentile) 1.80 1.94 1.45 1.70 2.52 2.37 5.50 
1%-3% (50
th
 
percentile) 1.51 1.67 1.13 1.13 1.66 2.16 7.16 
3%-8% (75
th
 
percentile) 1.24 1.89 0.85 1.35 1.46 2.22 11.65 
8%+ 1.15 1.36 1.01 0.69 1.43 2.10 12.04 
Data source: the CCER PLC database 2003-2008.  
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Table 4. Determinants of the acquisition-asset ratio (results of the first step) 
Treatment: acquisition intensity 
(%) 
Unrestricted sample  
 
Restricted sample 
Coef. Std.Err.  Coef. Std.Err. 
Log Cash -0.194*** 0.034  -0.157*** 0.034 
Log Intangible Asset -0.018*** 0.007  -0.011* 0.007 
Leverage -0.681*** 0.246  -0.768*** 0.241 
Log Capital Expenditure -0.025 0.029  -0.025 0.028 
Tobin’s Q 0.167*** 0.044  0.141*** 0.043 
Board Size 0.033 0.029  0.012 0.029 
Board Meeting times 0.046*** 0.012  0.051*** 0.011 
Independent Director 0.404 0.358  0.308 0.350 
Management holding -1.018** 0.465  -0.782* 0.453 
Duality -0.265* 0.136  -0.187 0.134 
           
Industry dummy yes  yes 
year dummy yes  yes 
Box-Cox transformation of 
treatment (acquisition intensity) 
yes 
 
yes 
Observation number 1998  1978 
Log likelihood  -4012.7  -3917.4 
Wald-Chi2  160.33***  136.75*** 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
normality test 
** 
 
** 
Balancing property t test ***  *** 
Notes: The Box–Cox transformation finds the maximum likelihood estimates of the 
parameters of the Box–Cox transform regressing the treatment variable A (acquisition 
intensity) on the control variables listed above. The set of the potential treatment 
values is divided into 4 intervals. The values of the evaluated at the representative 
point of each treatment interval are divided into 5 intervals to do the balancing 
property t to test that the conditional mean of the pre-treatment variables given the 
generalized propensity score is not different between units who belong to a particular 
treatment interval and units who belong to all other treatment intervals. * 10% level of 
significance; ** 5% level of significance; *** 1% level of significance. 
Source: own estimations using the CCER PLC database 2003-2008.  
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Appendix. Variable Statistics Description 
 
Acquiring sample (AS>0, Obs=2117) 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Growth of earnings top 3 board 
directors (%) 1918 18.08 58.71 -426.97 465.15 
Growth of earnings top 3 
managers (%) 1969 19.78 48.76 -259.03 464.77 
Growth of earnings all executive 
directors (%) 1954 14.41 62.16 -290.61 471.23 
Acquisition intensity (%) 2097 10.13 50.67 0.00 1858.65 
Log Cash 2097 19.48 1.43 -8.52 24.55 
Log Intangible Asset 2095 15.97 6.67 -9.21 23.88 
Leverage 2097 0.50 0.18 0.00 1.90 
Log Capital Expenditure 2000 18.37 1.87 8.71 26.13 
Tobin’s Q 2117 1.74 1.02 -0.03 4.59 
Board Size 2098 6.31 1.64 2.00 17.00 
Meeting times 2098 9.43 3.80 1.00 36.00 
Independent Director 2098 0.55 0.13 0.00 1.00 
Management holding 2098 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.78 
Duality 2098 0.90 0.30 0.00 1.00 
Full sample (AS>0 or AS=0, obs=8562) 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Growth of earnings top 3 board 
directors (%) 6668 15.93 61.39 -914.40 919.92 
Growth of earnings top 3 
managers (%) 6826 17.21 51.04 -916.09 917.70 
Growth of earnings all executive 
directors (%) 6802 7.45 64.62 -933.31 919.52 
Acquisition intensity (%) 7456 2.85 27.25 0.00 1858.65 
Log Cash 7456 19.28 1.48 -8.52 25.21 
Log Intangible Asset 7453 15.28 7.32 -9.21 23.89 
Leverage 7456 0.50 0.40 0.00 16.33 
Log Capital Expenditure 7068 18.08 1.90 8.58 26.13 
Tobin’s Q 8562 2.14 1.38 -9.12 8.05 
Board Size 7458 6.32 1.62 0.00 19.00 
Meeting times 7458 8.32 3.45 1.00 36.00 
Independent Director 7457 0.55 0.13 0.00 1.00 
Management holding 7458 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.95 
Duality 7458 0.90 0.30 0.00 1.00 
 
